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In this paper we analyse and quantify the extent to which corporate disclosure for the financial 
year 2003 allows for verification of the independence of directors formally identified as 
independent by the 40 Italian blue chips. In order to do this, we used as a benchmark the 
voluntary independence requirements of the Italian Corporate Governance Code (Preda Code, 
2002) and the voluntary independence requirements of the EC Recommendation (2005) on 
non-executive and supervisory directors (a proxy for international best practice). This is a new 
methodology that can be applied equally to any other country: to our knowledge so far 
nobody has systematically verified whether listed companies in fact apply the independence 
standards they declare that they follow. We find that, for the two key independence 
requirements of not having business relationships with the company and not having too many 
concurrent commitments outside the company, the level of compliance is dramatically low: 
4% and 16% respectively. Overall, it is possible to verify compliance with all the Italian 
independence standards for only 5 out of the 284 directors formally identified as independent 
by their companies, and for only 4 directors with respect to the EC standards. The results of 
this study bring into question the effectiveness of securities market monitoring and call for 
further quantitative analysis of corporate governance. 
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1. Introduction: the need for a new measure of director independence 
 
Parties in control of a corporation are in a position to extract private benefits of control that do 
not accrue to non-controlling shareholders. Such private benefits can be of a psychological 
nature (community prestige, that is the pleasure managers experience being at the top of a 
large organization) but can also take the form of wealth extraction at the expense of minority 
outside shareholders. Wealth extraction can take several forms, from outright theft, to transfer 




One important focus of the corporate governance literature is on the mechanisms that may 
help limit wealth extraction. This issue is important because financial development, that is the 
willingness of investors to provide funds to companies, is severely hampered in the absence of 
guarantees against wealth expropriation of outside investors.
3 
 
Adam Smith (1776), Berle and Means (1932) and Jensen and Meckling (1976), address the 
agency problem between managers and shareholders caused by dispersed ownership structure. 
The problem is that small shareholders lack economic incentives to spend resources to control 
management. As noted by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), large shareholders do have economic 
incentives to gather information and monitor management. By exercising their voting control, 
large shareholders do put pressure on management to act in shareholder interest. However, as 
showed by Demsetz (1983), Fama and Jensen (1985), and Grossman and Hart (1988), a 
concentrated share ownership structure also brings an incentive for controlling shareholders to 
expropriate minority shareholders. There is a danger that controlling shareholders use their 
influence to transfer corporate assets to themselves at below-market prices.
4 
 
The consequence is seen as having a direct impact on company economic performance, since 
in both cases the company is not run in the interest of (all) its suppliers of finance. Finally, 
even when a company manager pursues a profit-maximizing behavior, she may have incentive 
not to return the money to investors: for instance, instead of distributing dividends she may 
embark the company on costly investment projects.
5  
 
Inquiry into the dynamics of private benefits of control is the focus of Grossman and Hart 
(1988) and Bebchuk (1999): Grossman and Hart (1988) observe that the allocation of voting 
rights influences whether control will rest in the hands of a high private benefit party or a high 
security benefit party; Bebchuk (1999) observes that private benefits of control are an 
incentive for controlling shareholders to maintain a lock on control and to prevent the 
formation of dispersed ownership.  
 
Empirical measures of private benefits of control 
 
Empirical studies of private benefits of control try to measure whether the controlling votes 
are valued more than non-controlling ones.
6  
                                                 
2 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 9-10. 
3 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, La Porta et al. 1997 and 1998. 
4 For a general introduction to the theory of conflicts of interest, see Kraakman, Davies et al. 2004, particularly 
chapters 1, 3, and 5. 
5 Shleifer and Vishny 1997, p. 10. 
6 Overviews of this subject are provided by Shleifer and Vishny 1997, Nenova 2003, and Dyck and Zingales 
2004.   3
 
These studies take recourse to two different methodologies. A first group of studies measures 
the value of control-block votes, while a second group measures the value of a single vote.  
 
Controlling block trades. One methodology is to focus on privately negotiated transfers of 
controlling blocks in publicly traded companies: “The assumption made is that the price per 
share an acquirer pays for the controlling block reflects the cash flow benefits from his 
fractional ownership and the private benefits stemming from his controlling position in the 
firm. By contrast, the market price of a share after the change in control is announced reflects 
only the cash flow benefits non-controlling shareholders expect to receive under the new 
management. Hence, the difference between the price per share paid by the acquiring party 




As a result of such a methodology, countries are ranked according to a ratio of value of 
control to value of equity. The most recent estimates in this respect are those provided by 
Dyck and Zingales 2004.  
 
Vote premium studies. An alternative methodology consists of linking the extraction of 
private benefits by controlling shareholders to their willingness to pay a premium price for 
voting shares at the moment of their acquiring control of the company. Some of the relevant 
studies in this field are Zingales (1994 and 1995a), Rydqvist (1996), Modigliani and Perotti 
(1998), and Nenova 2003.
8  
 
To sum up the findings of this literature, we may say that, although methodologies differ and 
the number of companies included in the various samples is limited, in some EU states there 
might be a significant level of private benefits of control. With particular reference to Italy, 
such benefits are the highest in relative terms in all the more recent and complete studies. In 
the Nenova study, the value of control-block votes in Brazil, Chile, France, Italy, and Mexico 
is one-quarter or more of firm market capitalization. Such figures are confirmed by Dyck and 
Zingales 2004 as regards Italy in particular, while France in this study shows a low level of 
private benefits. It should also be noted that while in general such studies are based on a small 
number of observations for each country, in one of these studies
9 Italy is covered with a rather 
large set of cases.
10  
                                                 
7 Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 1. 
8 According to the definition of such a method provided by Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 9: “The second method 
of estimating the value of private benefits of control uses the price difference between two classes of stock, with 
similar or identical dividend rights, but different voting rights. If control is valuable, then corporate votes, which 
allocate control, should be valuable as well. How valuable? It depends on how decisive some votes are in 
allocating control and how valuable control is. If one can find a reasonable proxy for the strategic value of votes 
in winning control - for example in forming a winning coalition block - then one can infer the value of control 
from the relationship between the market price of the votes and their strategic role.” As underlined by Marcello 
Bianchi in a private interview, the main problem of this methodology is that prices of non-voting classes of 
shares often are highly variable due to the limited quantities traded. 
9 Nenova 2003. 
10 The latest available data are provided by the annual report of the Consob (the Italian stock market regulator) 
for 2003, p. 9: out of 21 cases identified, the average premium for the purchase of controlling blocks is 12.3%. 
Such findings are also confirmed from non-systematic findings reported in the press. For instance, Penati 2004a 
refers to recent cases in which controlling voting blocks in Italian listed companies have been paid a premium 
between 30% and almost 100% vis-à-vis their stock market price. For a general treatment on the importance of 
shareholder expropriation in Italian corporate governance, see Rajan and Zingales 2004 and Pinza and Zoppini 
2004.   4
 
The role of independent directors in preventing shareholder expropriation 
 
There is an increasing tendency in the financial, institutional and, to a certain extent, academic 
world to see independent directors as an important preserve against the opportunism of 
management and controlling shareholders.
11  For instance, according to Bhagat and Black 
(2001), p. 232, there is a “conventional wisdom that the board’s principal task is to monitor 
management, and only independent directors can be effective monitors.” 
 
Practically all existing corporate governance codes or guidelines today contain a section on 
independent directors with varying (and, over time, increasing) proportions of independent 
directors recommended and with varying (and increasingly restrictive) definitions of 
independence.
12   This trend is acknowledged by supranational institutions: the OECD 
Principles of Corporate Governance of 2004 recommend that boards should consider 
assigning a sufficient number of non-executive board members capable of exercising 
independent judgement to tasks where there is a potential for conflict of interest,
13 while the 
point of view of the EC Recommendation on the role of non-executive and supervisory 
directors of 2005
14 (hereafter EC Recommendation) is that independent directors have a role 
to play both in companies with dispersed ownership, where the primary concern is about how 
to make managers accountable to weak shareholders, and in companies with controlling 
shareholders, where the focus is more on how to make sure that the company will be run in a 
way that sufficiently takes into account the interests of minority shareholders. 
 
In the academic literature, the origin of the argument which conceives the role of independent 
directors to be that of checking management tendency to pursue selfish goals goes back at 
least to Fama and Jensen (1983), who observe that optimal board structures require inside 
directors to be complemented by outside directors
15 who should be especially entrusted with 
advising and policing the board on strategic decisions. The authors observe that outside 
directors are most apt to carry out tasks that involve potential conflicts of interest between 
managers and shareholders as they are less likely to collude with management to expropriate 
shareholders. 
 
                                                 
11  Of course, independent directors are not the only measure allowing the prevention of such opportunistic 
behavior. See Dyck and Zingales 2004, p. 5-7, for a list of other possible factors able to limit the extraction of 
private benefits of control by controlling shareholders, and Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, p. 5-8, who propose 
the idea that boards of directors originally emerged as a guarantee against managerial misappropriation. 
12 See Bhagat and Black 2001, p. 232, and OECD 2003, p. 62, for a list of institutions that recommend the 
presence of independent directors on company boards. The website of the European Corporate Governance 
Institute (www.ecgi.org) presents a complete list of the major corporate governance codes around the world. A 
comparison is provided by Weil, Gotshal & Manges 2002. 
13 OECD 2004. It is interesting to note that the Principles were endorsed by the OECD Meeting at Ministerial 
Level in May 2004. 
14 EC Recommendation of 15 February 2005, on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed 
companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board, http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_052/l_05220050225en00510063.pdf 
15 According to Hermalin and Weisbach 2003, p. 2, “Inside directors are employees or former employees of the 
firm. They generally are not thought to be independent of the CEO, since the success of their careers is often tied 
to the CEOs. Outside directors are not employees of the firm and usually do not have any business ties to the 
firm aside from their directorships. Outside directors are typically CEOs from other firms or prominent 
individuals in other fields. Finally, about 10% of directors fall into neither category; often these are attorneys or 
businesspeople that have a longstanding relationship with the firm. These directors are usually referred to as 
‘affiliated’ or ‘gray’ directors.”   5
Among the ensuing contributions to the debate, Lorsch and MacIver (1989) indicate that 
independent directors are crucial because they can objectively evaluate and monitor firm 
activity. Byrd and Hickman (1992) observe that independent directors are responsible for 
protecting and promoting the interests of minority shareholders. Millstein (1993) calls for a 
“constructive tension” between shareholders and boards and between boards and managers, 
achieved by an independent credible board.  
 
In Black (2001), independent directors are listed among the few “useful institutions” who can 
help shareholders in identifying disclosure problems. Their role is considered as particularly 
useful since independent directors, as opposed to investment bankers, accountants, and 
securities lawyers, are part of the board and can have a more complete perspective on the 
management. Eckbo (2005) calls for “a vigorous corporate governance system” to prevent 
shareholder rights being expropriated by corporate insiders.  
 
Finally, the main rating agencies’ focus of their corporate governance analysis is on the 
independence and effectiveness of the board of directors, of which the presence of a qualified 
number of independent directors is a key element.
16  
 
So independent directors are considered as one of the main instruments against shareholder 
expropriation and for that reason their presence is recommended by national corporate 
governance codes and supranational institutions.
17 In Italy, where the degree of shareholder 
expropriation seems to be particularly high, the presence of independent directors on 
corporate boards of listed companies is constantly increasing.
18 But are those independent 
directors really independent? To our knowledge, existing studies refer to board independence 
based on how many directors are qualified as independent by the issuer itself, and there are no 
systematic inquiries into whether listed companies in Italy
19 really apply the independence 
standards they declare to follow.
20 The aim of this article is to check whether it is possible to 
verify independence through company disclosure. The paper is structured as follows: chapter 
2 illustrates the methodology used; chapter 3 illustrates the results of our enquiry, and chapter 
4 contains the conclusions.  
 
 
2. Methodology used 
 
The perspective we have chosen is that of the investor who should be in a position to verify, 
to a reasonable extent,
21   the existence of the independence criteria of the corporate 
governance code the issuer declares to adopt.
22  
                                                 
16 For instance, Moody’s recommends (Moody’s 2003, p. 5) “a strong and clearly independent majority on the 
board, with audit, compensation and nominating/governance committees composed exclusively of independent 
directors.” 
17 It is important to specify that the present paper does not aim at discussing whether independent directors are 
useful to prevent shareholder expropriation: it merely starts from the observation that, as said, multilateral 
organisms, national corporate governance codes, rating agencies and large part of the academic world deem it so. 
For a contrary voice on the usefulness of independent directors see Becht et al. 2002, particularly p. 42-45.  
18 See Assonime 2005. 
19 Or in any other EU country.  
20 This subject is actually at the frontier of corporate governance, at least in Europe, and it covers the wider field 
of whether regulatory authorities of some kind monitor the actual implementation of the various corporate 
governance codes that have been recently adopted in many EU countries. From OECD (2003), it emerges that 
such procedures do not exist or are not developed. 
21 For instance, the EC Recommendation, which may be considered as an international standard, specifies that 
(art. 11.4): "When the appointment of a director is proposed, disclosure should be made of his particular   6
 
The population chosen is made up of directors declared as independent by the 40 listed 
companies that make up the S&P/MIB index.
23 As of December 2004, the index represented 
approximately 78% of the total capitalization of the Italian stock market (Borsa Italiana)
24.  
As for its composition, we relied on the composition of the index as of September 17, 2004, 
the last date available at the time the present research started (December 2004). The list of the 
companies that make up the index is reported in Annex A.    
 
The independence standards are those provided by the Italian corporate governance code 
(Preda Code) and by the EC Recommendation on the role of non-executive and supervisory 
directors.
25   
 
We chose as a first benchmark the Preda Code because it is the corporate governance code 
adopted by Borsa Italiana in 1999 and updated in 2002.
26 Although the provisions set by the 
Preda Code are not mandatory, the bylaws set by Borsa Italiana
27 require all Italian listed 
companies to present a yearly corporate governance report in which it must be mentioned 
whether and to what extent they have adhered to the Preda Code. It is an implementation of 
the comply-or-explain principle, which is aimed at allowing companies to apply corporate 
governance principles according to their own specificities. In 2003, almost all 40 companies 
belonging to the S&P/MIB index adhered to the independence requirements provided by the 
Preda Code.  
 
We chose the EC Recommendation as a proxy for international best practice. The 
Recommendation, which is non-binding, concentrates on the role of non-executive or 
supervisory directors in key areas where executive or managing directors may have conflicts 
of interest. It includes minimum standards for the qualifications, commitment, and 
independence of non-executive or supervisory directors. 
 
                                                                                                                                                         
competences which are relevant to his service on the (supervisory) board. to enable markets and the public to 
assess whether these competences remain appropriate over time, the (supervisory) board should disclose every 
year a profile of the board's composition and information on the particular competences of individual directors 
which are relevant to their service on the (supervisory) boards."; and that (art. 13.3): "Proper information should 
be disclosed on the conclusions reached by the (supervisory) board in its determination of whether a particular 
director should be regarded as independent." 
22 This is also the reference chosen by Borsa Italiana, as can be seen from Assonime 2004, p. 19: “La Relazione 
non può, in generale, limitarsi a una mera dichiarazione di adesione di principio al Codice di autodisciplina nel 
suo complesso e ai principi cui esso si ispira (creazione del valore per gli azionisti, centralità del CdA, ecc.), né 
può limitarsi a parafrasare il Codice di autodisciplina o a divulgare un eventuale Codice interno di 
comportamento; essa deve spiegare come la società ha applicato le singole disposizioni del Codice.” Investor 
information is also the approach chosen by other systems. For instance in the UK, as stressed by Financial 
Reporting Council (2003), p. 7: "Under the UK Listing Authority's Listing Rules, a listed company incorporated 
in the UK is required to include in its annual report and accounts: a statement of how it has applied the principles 
set out in Section 1 of the Code, providing explanation which enables its shareholders to evaluate how the 
principles have been applied…"  
23   For details on the methodology with which the index is built, see 
http://www.borsaitalia.it/pdf/it/mercati/indici/spmib/metodologiacompleta.pdf  
24 Borsa Italiana, Titoli indice S&P/MIB, Capitalizzazione al 31.12.2004, www.borsaitalia.it  
25 EC Recommendation of 15 February 2005, on the role of non-executive or supervisory directors of listed 
companies and on the committees of the (supervisory) board), http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2005/l_052/l_05220050225en00510063.pdf 
26 http://www.ecgi.org/codes/code.php?code_id=66 Remark that a new version of the Code, adopted in February 
2006, will be applicable starting from 2007. 
27  Istruzioni al Regolamento dei mercati organizzati e gestiti da Borsa Italiana S.p.A dell’8 ottobre 2004,     
http://www.borsaitalia.it/opsmedia/pdf/14923.pdf    7
The adoption of a double standard for independence allows us to account for the national 
(Italian) specificities in corporate governance and at the same time to take into account the 
convergence process underway among corporate governance systems.
28 Besides, it is essential 
to evaluate the degree of openness of Italian listed companies to international standards of 
finance, an essential precondition to gain access to globalized capital. 
 
The empirical analysis was conducted on the basis of the documents referring to 2003, as 
published by the issuers and made available on the same issuers’ websites or on the websites 
of Borsa Italiana and the Consob (the Italian stock market regulator).
29  
 
We used three different kinds of rates: "yes" as an indicator of compliance with independence 
criteria: it means that it is possible to verify from company disclosure that the independent 
director satisfies the independence criteria set by the Preda Code and by the EC 
Recommendation; “no” means that it is possible to verify from company disclosure the   
inadequacy to the criterion despite the company’s declaration that the director satisfies the 
criterion: it is an indicator of non-compliance;
30 “ns” means that it is not possible to verify 
from company disclosure the adequacy or inadequacy to the criterion (lack of disclosure). 
“Ns” should then be interpreted as a milder level of non-compliance than “no” that does not 
allow to assign a "yes" rate. 
 
Both the Preda Code and the EC Recommendation contain general clauses referring to the 
fact that independence criteria have to be interpreted with reference to significance thresholds. 
Since neither Borsa Italiana nor any of the issuers provided more guidance, in each case we 
have provided a specific evaluation of such significance thresholds, making use of available 
empirical evidence (see Annex B).   
 
For all the independence criteria for which an evaluation of the directors’ CV is required, we 
consider a CV as complete whenever it allows the reconstruction of the professional and/or 
academic career of the director since its beginning. Particular attention is devoted to the 
coverage of the last 3-5 years, for which several Preda and EC criteria apply.  
 
Finally, the purpose of the present study is not to verify that independent directors of Italian 
blue chips are not independent in their actual behavior; rather, it is to verify the extent to 
which listed companies justify compliance with independence requirements.
31 As specified by 
the European Commission (2005), the determination of what constitutes independence should 






                                                 
28 On the last point, see Hansmann and Kraakman 2001. 
29www.borsaitalia.it and www.consob.it More specifically, reference is made to: (i) annual reports for 2003; (ii) 
corporate governance reports for 2003; (iii) control agreements (where present); (iv) CVs of independent 
directors (where present): either from companies’ websites or from  cg reports or annual reports; and (v) 
company profiles provided on the Borsa Italiana and Consob websites. 
30  Of course, we take into account the motivations provided, if any, by issuers who declare they consider 
independent a director who does not satisfy a specific independence requirement.  
31 In this we follow the general rule recommended by Higgs (2003), p. 37: "The board should state its reasons if 
a director is considered to be independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or circumstances which 
may appear relevant to its determination."   
32 Recital 18 of the Recommendation.   8
2.1 Preda criteria vs EC criteria 
 
As seen in Table 1 and in Annex B, the Preda Code is made up of 5 different independence 
criteria, while the EC Recommendation is made up of 11 criteria. The object of the present 
study is to verify compliance with these 16 criteria.
33  
 
Table 1. Comparison of Preda and EC criteria 
  
PR_A (business relationships)  EC_A (executive in the (assoc.) company) 
  EC_B (employee of the (assoc.) company) 
  EC_D (representing controlling shareholders) 
  EC_E (business relationship) 
  EC_F (external auditor) 
PR_B (shares owned)   
PR_C (family ties)  EC_I (family ties) 
PR_D (professional qualification)  EC_L (professional qualification) 
PR_E (other commitments)  EC_M (other commitments) 
  EC_H (permanence on the board) 
  EC_C (additional remuneration) 
  EC_G (cross-directorships) 
 
 
A first conclusion that can be made by comparing the Preda and the EC sets of independence 
criteria is that EC criteria are more explicit. In particular, criteria EC_A, EC_B, EC_D, EC_E, 
and EC_F are all comprised within PR_A. This means that EC criteria illustrate the same 
independence requirement (business relationship) by splitting it into its composing parts, 
although with two differences. On the one hand, the Preda Code specifies that members of 
executive committees are not to be considered executive directors, something the EC 
Recommendation does not specify; on the other hand, while in PR_A a relationship with an 
external auditor is relevant only as far as the previous year, in EC_F it goes as far as three 
years back.  
 
The second conclusion is that the Preda Code considers three fewer independence criteria than 
the EC Recommendation: additional remuneration, cross directorships, and permanence on 
the board (respectively EC_C, EC_G, and EC_H). Finally, criteria EC_I, EC_L, and EC_M 
have an exact correspondence respectively in PR_C, PR_D, and PR_E.  
 
Moreover, not all criteria, per se, allow for a thorough investor verification, short of 
investigative inquiries of some kind. The consequence is that the results of the present inquiry 
present an image of compliance to independence standards which could be more positive (or 
less negative) than the actual situation. 
 
As we have seen, the Preda and the EC criteria are not mandatory. However, according to the 
full meaning of the “comply or explain” principle endorsed by both documents, issuers should 
declare which criteria they do not apply and explain why, something which Italian issuers 
rarely did in their disclosure documentation for 2003. The only exception was, in a few cases, 
the disclosure that related-party transactions involving independent directors had taken place 
                                                 
33 It is also clear from Annex B that when two criteria have the same name they do not necessarily have the same 
content.    9
at market prices. However, even this disclaimer does not appear to be relevant, since the 
problem at issue here is not verifying that independent directors enjoyed private benefits from 
their position on the board by conducting transactions with the company at below-market 
prices, but that their independence is not conditioned by any economic link with the company 
other than their position as an independent director.  
 
3. RESULTS   
 
We examine here the rates assigned to our population of 284 directors
34 qualified  as 
independent by their companies with regard to the independence criteria set by the Preda 
Code and by the EC Recommendation. With the exception of the EC_G criterion, we do not 
make any reference in this paper to the companies on whose boards such directors sit.  
 
3.1 General results: Preda Code vs EC Recommendation 
We examine here the rates assigned to our population of 284 directors with regard to the 
independence criteria set by the Preda Code and by the EC Recommendation.  
 
Table 2 
Adequacy rates by set of criteria 
(Preda-EC)        
            
   Preda     
EC (7 
criteria)    
EC (11 
criteria)    
   percentage 
cumulative 





no  16.27 16.27  16.15  16.15  12.55  12.55 
ns  26.06 42.32  24.14  40.29  35.95  48.50 
yes  57.68 100  59.71  100  51.50  100 
 
We begin by examining the total rates assigned to all of the 284 directors on all 5 Preda 
criteria. As seen in Table 2 (in the first two columns), out of the total 1,420 rates for all 5 
criteria (284 x 5), only 819 are “yes” rates (58%). In 26% of the cases, the result was “ns”, 
while for the remaining 16% the result was “no”. This means that, out of the remaining 42% 
of the total rates, roughly 1/3 is due to the non-compliance to Preda criteria which emerges 
from company disclosure itself: in these cases, issuers provide contradictory information on 
director independence. In the remaining 2/3 of cases, it is not possible to verify compliance 
with independence requirements due to the lack of disclosure.   
 
As seen in Table 2 (in the fifth and sixth columns), the 284 directors of our population show 
compliance with the 11 EC independence criteria for only 51.5% of the cases. For 36% of 
cases, the result was “ns” while for the remaining 12.6% the result was “no”. The lower level 
of compliance compared to the Preda Code, as illustrated above, could lead to a first 
conclusion that the directors in our population have a lower rate of compliance with 
international (EU) best practice than with the Italian Preda requirements. This seems to be due 
to a higher percentage of “ns” rates, which is also responsible for the lower percentage of 
“no” rates.  
 
                                                 
34 Please understand that in ten cases the same person sits on two boards of the S&P/Mib index, so that in the 
present study, 284 actually refers to the number of directorships.    10
A somewhat different interpretation is possible if we take into account that which is specified 
in par. 2.1: that 5 out of 11 EC independence criteria are summed up within PR_A. In order to 
allow for a full comparison between the Preda and EC criteria, it is then useful to substitute 
EC_A, EC_B, EC_D, EC_E, and EC_F with PR_A. The third and fourth columns (“EC 7”) in 
Table 2 show that in this case compliance with EC criteria is almost identical with Preda. The 
reason for the difference between EC 11 and EC 7 lies in the different drafting style chosen by 
the two sets of criteria: the EC Recommendation introduces, for the sake of clarity, 5 different 
criteria to describe a situation which in the Preda Code is compressed within a single 
independence criterion, PR_A. As a result, we have for EC a sort of “multiplier effect” which, 
unless corrected, prevents a full comparison of the two sets of requirements: lack of disclosure 
for one of the several profiles that make up the PR_A criterion may correspond to several, up 
to five, “ns” rates in EC, something which explains the higher percentage of “ns” rates in the 
EC 11 indicator shown in Table 2.    
 
Hereafter, we will continue referring to the EC 11 indicator in order to have a deeper 
analytical view on the independence profiles of the directors considered within the present 




Preda Criteria       
N° of criteria satisfied 
(“yes” rates)  N° of directors  percentage 
cumulative 
percentage 
5 5  1.8  1.8 
4 18  6.3  8.1 
3 201  70.8  78.9 
2 59  20.8  99.6 
1 1  0.4  100 
Total 284  100    
 
 
A further indicator is given by the number of directors who show compliance with both Preda 
and EC criteria. As seen in Table 3, only for 5 directors out of 284, that is 2% of the total, is it 
possible to verify compliance with all 5 Preda independence criteria. Even considering those 
directors who show compliance with 4 out of 5 independence criteria, the total number of 
directors is 18, that is 6% of the total population. This means that the directors who show 
compliance at least with 4 out of 5 Preda criteria add up to 8% of the total population. The 
bulk of the directors included in the population (71%) show compliance with 3 requirements 
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Table 4 
EC Criteria (EC7)      
N° of criteria satisfied 
(“yes” rates)  N° of directors  percentage
Cumulative 
percentage 
7 4  1.4  1.4 
6 13  4.6  6 
5 92  32.4  38.4 
4 106  37.3  75.7 
3 60  21.1  96.8 
2 8  2.8  99.6 
1 1  0.4  100 
Total 284  100   
 
The picture does not change much if we consider the number of directors who show 
compliance with EC 7 criteria (Table 4). Only for 4 directors (1% of the total) is it possible to 
verify compliance with all 7 criteria, while 13 directors show compliance with 6 out of 7 
criteria. This means that directors who show compliance with at least 6 out of 7 independence 
criteria add up to 6% of the total number of directors considered in our inquiry. As for Preda 
criteria, we find the bulk of directors at the center of the distribution, in this case between 3 
and 5 criteria out of 7, where we find 91% of the population. This can also be seen in Table 5, 
which shows that in the area between 3 and 5 EC Criteria and 2 and 3 Preda criteria we find 




of criteria (%) 
 
                      
Preda criteria 
EC 7 
criteria 1  2  3  4  5  6 7  Total 
1   0.0 0.0 0.35 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0  0.35
2   0.35 2.11 9.86 8.10 0.35 0.0  0.0  20.77
3   0.0 0.7 10.92 29.23 29.93 0.0  0.0  70.77
4   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.11 4.23  0.0  6.34
5   0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.35  1.41  1.76
 Total  0.35 2.82 21.13 37.32 32.39 4.58  1.41  100
 
 
The same result is visible if we consider the complete set of EC criteria (Table 6): in this case 
about 91% of the total population of 284 directors can be found in the area between 2 and 3 
















( % )                     T o t a l  
Preda 
criteria 
EC 11  
criteria 2  3  4  5  6  7 8 9  10  11 
1  0.0  0.0 0.35 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.35
2  0.35  2.82 8.45 7.39 1.06 0.70 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.77
3  0.0 1.41 10.56 23.24 22.89 4.23 4.93  3.52  0.0 0.0 70.77
4  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.35 1.06 1.06 2.11 1.41 0.35 6.34
5  0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.35 0.35 1.06 1.76
    Total  0.35  4.23 19.37 30.63 24.30 5.99 5.99 5.99 1.76 1.41 100
 
 
Finally, the reason the results for Preda and EC criteria are very close is that, as shown in par. 
2.1, out of the 11 criteria included by the EC Recommendation only 3 are different from the 
ones provided by the Preda Code. Table 7 compares compliance between the 5 Preda criteria 





directors (%)  EC*             
Preda  0 1  2 3 Total 
1 0.0  0.0  0.35 0.0 0.35 
2 0.35  2.11  9.86 8.45 20.77 
3 0.7  10.92  29.23 29.93 70.77 
4 0.0  0.0  2.11 4.23 6.34 
5 0.0  0.0  0.35 1.41 1.76 
Total 1.06  13.03  41.90 44.01 100 
          
*cross-directorship (EC_G), permanence on the board (EC_H), 




The table shows that the three “new” EC criteria impose a further selection. Considering, for 
instance, the 71% of directors who show compliance with 3 out of 5 Preda criteria, we 
observe that for only less than half of them it is possible to verify compliance with all three 
“new” EC criteria.  
 
3.2 Compliance with Preda criteria  
 
It could be said that, apart from “no” rates, lack of disclosure (“ns” rates) may be due to the 
difficulty in providing information to allow investors to verify compliance with independence 
requirements. The purpose of this subsection is to provide an answer to this observation by 
examining compliance for each criterion separately (Table 8).  
 
- PR_A (business relationships) and PR_E (other commitments)   13
Respectively, 96% and 84% of the 284 independent directors do not show compliance with 
these two independence requirements. More specifically, for PR_A 11% of the directors 
receive a “no” rate while 85% of directors receive an “ns” rate. For PR_E, 69% of the 
directors receive a “no” rate while 14% of directors receive an “ns” rate.
35  
 
- PR_B (shares owned) 
The percentage of “yes” rates for this criterion is very high: 99%. This means that very few 
independent directors own controlling shares (or shares that give a considerable influence) in 
the company on whose board they sit.  
 
- PR_C (family ties) 
The percentage of “yes” is 79%. As specified in Annex B, for this criterion we relied only on 
issuers’ statements, something which explains the absence of “no”.  
 
Even so, there is a sizable percentage of “ns” (21%) due to the fact that in such cases issuers 
did not state explicitly that independent directors had no family ties with subjects referred to 
in PR_A and PR_B.   
 
- PR_D (professional qualification) 
89% of directors show compliance with this criterion. As specified in Annex B, as this 
criterion is very difficult not only to verify but also to define, we adopted a rather “generous” 
interpretation. 
 
The conclusion so far is that behind the general rate of compliance with the Preda 
independence criteria (58%), which is already rather low, lies a very diversified situation. 
First, there is a very low degree of compliance (as measured by the percentage of “yes” rates 
relative to total rates) for the PR_A and PR_E requirements. It is not necessary to stress that 
both criteria are essential prerequisites for director independence, or at least that without them 
it is not possible to talk about a director being independent.  
 
Secondly, PR_A and PR_E are also two criteria that can be more easily verified (as shown in 
Annex B, par. B3), while two of the requirements that show the highest level of compliance 
(PR_C and PR_D) are also the less verifiable ones. The answer to the question we asked 















                                                 
35 It is important to notice that for this last criterion the database available refers only to commitments in listed 




Preda code      
PR_A Business relationship 
N° of 
directors Percentage cumulative  percentage 
No 32  11.3  11.3 
Ns 240  84.5  95.8 
Yes 12  4.2  100 
Total  284    
PR_B Shares owned      
No 2  0.7  0.7 
Yes 282  99.3  100 
Total  284    
PR_C Family ties      
Ns 59  20.8  20.8 
Yes 225  79.2  100 
Total  284    
PR_D Professional qualification      
No 1  0.4  0.4 
Ns 29  10.2  10.6 
Yes 254  89.4  100 
Total  284    
PR_E Other commitments      
No 196  69.0  69.0 
Ns 42  14.2  83.8 
Yes 46  16.8  100 
Total  284    
 
 
From these two points we draw a first conclusion that, to an important extent, independence 
criteria are either not verifiable or are contradicted by company disclosure. Although, as 
specified above (par. 2), director independence should not be seen mechanically as 
compliance with independence criteria, these results still cast a strong doubt on the 
independence of Italian independent directors.  
 
 
3.3 Compliance with EC independence criteria (Table 9) 
 
We begin by examining the five EC criteria that correspond
36 to PR_A.  
 
- EC_A (executive in the (assoc.) company) 
As seen in Table 9, only 8.5% of directors show compliance with this criterion with the rest 
distributed between 66.5% of “ns” rates and 26.1% of “no” rates. The level of “yes” rates is 
very close to PR_A, something which tells us that EC_A mimics PR_A as far as compliance 
is concerned. The difference between EC_A and PR_A lies essentially in the higher 
percentage of “no” rates in EC_A which is attributable to the fact that the Preda Code 
explicitly excludes that directors belonging to executive committees be considered as 
executives, while the EC Recommendation does not.  
 
                                                 
36 With the important point made in par. 2.1.   15
- EC_B (employee in the (assoc.) company) 
In this case, compliance is at 21.5%, while 77.5% is made up of “ns” rates, with just 1% of 
“no” rates.  
 
- EC_D (representing controlling shareholders) 
Compliance here is at 89.8%, which allows the conclusion that the directors considered within 
our population are not related to or identifiable with controlling shareholders. This conclusion 
is also confirmed by the results in PR_B (see above par. 3.2).  
 
- EC_E (business relationships) 
This criterion presents a level of compliance very close to EC_A (and PR_A). Again, in this 
case, lack of transparency is the main factor (82.7%), while non-compliance is at 6.7%. 
Overall, EC_E replicates the lack of disclosure already seen for EC_A, which is essentially 
attributable to the fact that the directors’ CVs were absent or incomplete.  
 
- EC_F (external auditor) 
Compliance here is at 22.5%, while the remaining 77.5% is made up of “ns” rates. The latter 
result is attributable mainly to lack of or incomplete CVs, just as in EC_B and EC_E. 
 
The conclusion on the 5 criteria that add up to PR_A is that the dramatically low level of 
compliance in PR_A is attributable essentially to lack of disclosure and to relationships of 
some kind (executive, business, employee) with the company or the associated company 
rather than relationships with controlling shareholders. Moreover, when there is mandatory 
disclosure, as in EC_A, the percentage of “no” rates becomes very significant.    16
Table 9 
EC_A executive in the (ass.) company   N°  Percentage 
cumulative 
percentage 
No 74  26.1  26.1 
Ns 186  65.5  91.6 
Yes 24  8.5  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_B employee (associated) company     
No 3  1.1  1.1 
Ns 220  77.5  78.5 
Yes 61  21.5  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_C additional remuneration       
No 32  11.3  11.3 
Ns 25  8.8  20.1 
Yes 227  79.9  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_D controlling shareholder      
No   7  2.5  2.5 
Ns 22  7.7  10.2 
Yes 255  89.8  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_E business relationships      
No 19  6.7  6.7 
Ns 235  82.7  89.4 
Yes 30  10.6  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_F external auditor        
Ns 220  77.5  77.5 
Yes 64  22.5  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_G cross-directorships      
No 33  11.6  11.6 
Yes 251  88.4  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_H permanence on the board      
No 27  9.5  9.5 
Ns 85  29.9  39.4 
Yes 172  60.6  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_I family ties      
Ns 59  20.8  20.8 
Yes 225  79.2  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_L professional qualification      
No 1  0.4  0.4 
Ns 29  10.2  10.6 
Yes 254  89.4  100 
Total  284 100   
EC_M other commitments      
No 196  69.0  69.0 
Ns 42  14.8  83.8 
Yes 46  16.2  100 
Total  284 100     17
As for the three criteria that differentiate EC from Preda criteria, we will examine first EC_C and 
EC_H and then move on to EC_G, for which a different approach is required. 
 
- EC_C (additional remuneration) 
This criterion presents a high rate of compliance (80%), while the remaining rates are distributed  
between lack of disclosure (9%) and non-compliance (11%). 
 
- EC_H (permanence on the board) 
This criterion presents a majority rate of compliance (60.6%). However, an important 39.4% of 
the cases is distributed between “ns” rates (29.9%) and “no” rates (9.5%).  
 
The conclusion on the first two criteria that differentiate EC from Preda is that while a high 
percentage of directors does not have any additional remuneration from the company or 
associated companies, there is a significant percentage of directors who either were on the board 
for such a long time as to put into doubt their independence of judgement or for whom disclosure 
of the length of their permanence on the board is not given. It is important to have in mind that 
since, as specified in Annex B, disclosure provided by the Consob website in this respect goes as 
far as 1998, “ns” rates in this case were assigned to directors for whom their permanence on the 
board was not specified and who were reported by Consob website to be on the same board since 
1998. So, in this case, “ns” rates could be seen as being close to “no” rates. 
 
- EC_G (cross-directorships) 
As seen in Table 9, 88% of directors show compliance with this requirement, while the 
remaining 12% show non-compliance.
37  
 
It is also interesting to check which companies are involved in such cross-directorships 
established through independent directors (see Annex B for the illustration of this criterion). The 
logic is that cross-directorships are part of an underlying cooperative behavior between two or 
more companies, so that the specific directors involved are part of a wider game.
38 In Table 10, 
we have indicated the companies involved in cross-directorships links (thin arrows). In the first 
place, we find that 31 listed companies are involved in such cross-directorships, of which 22 
belong to the S&P/MIB index. Moreover, this web closely corresponds to the web of 
shareholdings among the same companies as represented in the same Table 10 (arrows in bold).
39 
The conclusion is that cross-directorships formed by independent directors follow relationships 
of cross-ownership. This suggests that the role of independent directors in such companies may 
                                                 
37 It is important to remember that, as explained in Annex B, the database provided by Consob to verify this criterion 
does not include unlisted companies. It is then possible that there are other cross-directorships that went unnoticed in 
our inquiry.   
38 For an illustration of the logic of the most consolidated cross-directorships system in Italy, the Mediobanca 
system, see De Cecco and Ferri 1986. 
39 Arrows in bold indicate shareholdings of at least 2% considered by the Italian regulation (art. 120 (2) Italian 
consolidated law on financial intermediation, or TUF) as indicating a significant interest in the company; dotted 
arrows indicate shareholdings held by controlling shareholders of the company in question.   18
be influenced by controlling or significant shareholders, something which would contradict their 
independence.    19
Table 10 
Cross-directorships and ownership links
40 
 
                                                 
40 Thin arrows refer to cross-directorship links; arrows in bold refer to ownership links (above 2% of total voting 
shares); dotted arrows in bold to ownership links (above 2% of total voting shares) involving a controlling 



































3.4 Where are the watchdogs?  
 
From the results described in the previous paragraphs, it emerges that there is a need for greater 
disclosure on what Italian listed companies declare about their independent directors. This being, 
to our knowledge, the first attempt to verify to what extent companies justify the independence 
requirements of their independent directors, it appears that until now the financial community 
and the Italian stock exchange have been satisfied by the present level of disclosure.  
 
Verifying how independent independent directors are belongs to the wider subject of the actual 
implementation of voluntary corporate governance codes by those issuers that have announced 
they are adopting them. It is a subject on the forefront of the corporate governance debate. As 
reported by OECD (2003), the last decade has seen an effort by national and multilateral fora to 
identify what a corporate governance code should contain, including a reference to independent 
directors. This phase has found a first conclusion with the approval of the new OECD guidelines 
for corporate governance (OECD 2004) and, at the EU level, with the introduction of the EC 
Recommendation on independent directors (European Commission 2005). Presently, at the top 
of the agenda is the necessity of being sure that, once companies declare they have adopted a 
voluntary corporate governance code, they actually provide such a level of disclosure as to give 
investors the ability to verify such a declaration, to a reasonable extent.
41   
 
In its final provisions, the EC Recommendation invites EU Member States to take the necessary 
measures to promote the application of the principles set out in the same Recommendation. It is 
in the spirit of the Recommendation, if not in its letter, that Member States should also introduce 
procedures to verify adherence to the independence requirements by those issuers that have 
declared to have adopted them.  
 
From one of the few success stories in this field, the British Cadbury Code
42, it is possible to 
have an idea about the way to ensure adherence to such codes. The Cadbury Code has been 
adopted by a great number of companies listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE). What is 
more important in this context is that the bylaws provided by the LSE delegate outside auditors 
to verify the actual implementation of the code.
43 
 
More in general, it would be advisable that, once listed companies declare they have adopted 
some provisions of a corporate governance code, they give adequate disclosure.
44 In this respect, 
a recent Italian Law
45 states that Italian listed companies must disclose yearly (according to the 
modalities which will be established by the Consob), information regarding the adherence to 
Conduct Codes and the compliance with the requirements provided by the same Codes, 
explaining the reason of possible non-compliance (non fulfilment). Moreover, the law also 
introduces sanctions against directors who make false statements about the respect of the rules 
provided by conduct codes of listed companies. Finally, the same law gives the Consob the task 
to verify that companies` declaration regarding the respect of the requirements provided by the 
Codes they declare to adopt are true. 
 
 
                                                 
41 OECD 2003, p. 31-35.  
42 The text can be downloaded free of charge from www.ecgi.org  
43 OECD 2003, p. 32. 
44 For the pros and cons of relying on control by financial markets vs. stock markets or public authorities, see 
Belcredi 2005.  
45Law 262/2005 "Disposizioni per la tutela del risparmio e la disciplina dei mercati finanziari" which came into 
force on 12 January 2006.    21
3.5 A Remark on the role of independent directors 
 
As pointed out in the introduction, the present paper does not deal with the theory of director 
independence: it is based on the observation that independent directors are widely considered a 
cornerstone of modern corporate governance even though there are a few authoritative voices 
who are sceptical that real independence may be achieved. However, the results of our study beg 
the following question: if it is allegedly so easy for companies to find independent directors who 
respect independence requirements formally but not substantially, why is it that they do not 
manage to reach a high level of disclosure? 
 
4. CONCLUSION  
 
In this article we have provided an interpretation for the independence requirements contained in 
the Preda Code and have checked them against a proxy for international best practice, the EC 
Recommendation on non-executive or supervisory directors of 2005.  
 
We have also checked whether company disclosure for 2003 allows the verification of 
compliance with independence requirements. For only 5 out of all 284 directors declared as 
independent by the 40 issuers considered in our study is it possible to verify adherence to all 
independence criteria set by the Preda Code (criteria the directors and their companies declared 
to follow), and for only 18 directors out of 284 is it possible to verify adherence to at least 4 out 
of 5 criteria.  
 
More in particular, looking at two key Preda criteria, for 96% of directors either it is not possible 
to verify the absence of business relationships with the company or an associated company or 
such independence is contradicted by company disclosure; and for 84% of directors, company 
disclosure either contradicts the requirement that independent directors have sufficient time to 
discharge their tasks or does not allow its verification.  
 
Checking company disclosure against the EC Recommendation, it also emerges that: for only 4 
out of 284 independent directors it is possible to verify the adherence to all EC independence 
criteria; there is a significant percentage of directors for whom it is either verified or there exists 
a possibility that they had such a long permanence on the board as to put into doubt their 
independence of judgment; and, finally, independent directors contribute to establish cross-
directorships across listed companies along the same lines as cross-ownership, something which 
suggests that at least some independent directors play an ancillary role with respect to controlling 
shareholders.  
 
The results of our study suggest that in almost all cases company disclosure either contradicts 
alleged director independence or does not allow to verify it. In this respect, a few possibilities 
exist. On the one hand, the financial community or public opinion in general should verify that 
the provisions of the Preda Code are applied, and the present article represents a contribution in 
this direction. Another possibility is that the Italian stock exchange or another authority monitor 
verify and disclose what issuers declare about their independent directors and adopt sanctions 
when needed. In this last respect, it is interesting to notice that a recent Italian law puts such a 
burden on the Italian stock market regulator (Consob). 
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Annex A: companies included in our population 
The following companies are included in our population. They made the S&P-Mib 40 Index 
as of September 17, 2004. 
 
Company 
N. of directors qualified as 
independent 
Alleanza Assicurazioni  9 
Assicurazioni Generali  13 
Autogrill 4 
Autostrade 4 
Banca Antonveneta  3 
Banca Fideuram  2 
Banca Intesa  7 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena  16 
Banca Popolare di Milano  20 
Banche Popolari Unite  20 











Fondiaria SAI  10 







Pirelli & Co  7 
RAS 12 
RCS Mediagroup spa  3 
San Paolo IMI  12 
Seat Pagine Gialle  3 
Snam Rete Gas  2 
STMicroelectronics 7 
Telecom Italia  5 
Telecom Italia Mobile  5 
Tiscali 2 
Unicredito   15 
Total 284 
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Annex B: interpretation of the independence criteria 
 
In this annex, we illustrate in detail our interpretation of the independence criteria set by the 
Preda Code and by the EC Recommendation. Such interpretation, although based on official 
documents, is to be considered as a free interpretation of the authors. It is not to be considered 
under any circumstances an official interpretation. 
 
B.1: Preda criteria 
 
PR_A (business relationships) 
 
[Independent directors] “do not entertain, directly or indirectly or on behalf of third parties, 
nor have recently entertained business relationships with the company, its subsidiaries, the 
executive directors or the shareholder or group of shareholders who controls the company of a 
significance able to influence their autonomous judgement.”
46 
 
We interpret the expression “indirectly” as involving not only the independent directors in 
person but also members of their families; professional partnerships of which independent 
directors are members; companies controlled by independent directors directly or indirectly; 
companies controlled by independent directors’ family members directly or indirectly; 
companies of which independent directors are executive directors
47  or  managers;  and 




In regard to the term “recently”, the Preda code (point 3.2, page 7) states that: “… In the case 
of earlier business dealings, reference should be made to the previous financial year and for 
work relationships and functions of executive director, to the three preceding financial years.” 
This means that the present criterion (PR_A) applies to the three previous financial years only 
when the independent director is at the same time executive director, consultant, employee, 
lawyer, representative of the company, the controlling shareholder, or the subsidiaries.
49 In 
this respect, a complete CV of the independent director is needed to allow verification of the 
present criterion. 
 
We interpret the expression “business relationships” as including relationships with (i) a 
significant supplier of goods or services (including financial, legal, advisory, or consulting 
                                                 
46 Preda Code, art. 3.1 (a) 
47 The Preda Code uses the more general term of “directors” (“amministratori” in Italian), which we interpret in 
this context more restrictively as executive directors. 
48 Such an interpretation is based on the following passage of the Preda Code: “For the purpose of assessing 
independence, ‘indirect’ business and shareholder relationships are also taken into consideration. It is therefore 
necessary to consider relationships between: on the one hand, directors, members of their families, the 
professional partnerships of which they are members, the companies they or members of their families control 
directly or indirectly, and the companies of which such persons are directors or managers and, on the other hand, 
the company in question, the shareholders who, directly or indirectly, control it, the executive directors, and the 
companies such persons control directly or indirectly.”  
49 On the other hand, the present criterion (PR_A) does not apply if the independent director is also the non-
executive director or member of the Italian “collegio sindacale” of the controlling shareholder, associated 
companies, companies that the corporation consolidates. This interpretation is based on art. 3.1 (c) of the Preda 
Code (see below) which states that an independent director cannot be an immediate family member of executive 
directors of the company or of persons in the situations referred to in points a) and b) of art. 3.1. From this must 
follow that the independent director must not be himself an executive director of the company or a person in the 
situations referred to in points a) and b) of art. 3.1.      29
services), (ii) a significant customer, and (iii) organizations that receive significant 
contributions from the company or its group.
50  
 
In all such cases, independent directors should not have business relationships with: the 
company in question (on whose board the independent director sits); controlling shareholders 
(directly or indirectly)
51; the executive directors of the company on whose board the 
independent director sits; the companies controlled directly or indirectly by the company in 
question, or its controlling shareholders and its executive directors. 
 
Concerning the term “executive directors”, the Preda code specifies that members of the 
executive committee are not to be considered executive directors. 
 
We interpret the term “control” with reference to art. 1, par. 1, 7th Company Directive.
52 The 
same for the term “subsidiaries”, defined in the Italian version of the Code as “controllate”. 
This means that we consider controlling shareholders those who appoint the majority of the 
board; and that in case of controlling agreements, all participants to such agreements are to be 
considered controlling shareholders. 
 
PR_B (shares owned) 
 
[Independent directors] “neither own, directly or indirectly
53 or on behalf of third parties, a 
quantity of shares enabling them to control
54the company or exercise a considerable 
influence
55 over it nor participate in shareholders’ agreements to control the company.”
56 
 
We interpret the term “significant influence” (or considerable influence) with reference to 
IAS 28: significant influence (influenza notevole) is the power to participate in the financial 
and operating policy decisions of the investee but is not control over those policies. An 
example of this case would be the participants in a minority shareholders’ agreement or a 
minority shareholder owning a sizable and relevant percentage of total shares. According to 
the Italian Civil Code, a “significant influence” in a listed company occurs if a shareholder, 
directly or indirectly, owns at least 10% of the total capital. However, we think that IAS 28 
gives a better proxy for the requirement made by Assonime (2004), par. 6.2.3, in that 
“Independence in directors is a quality that must be assessed substantively, and not only 
formally, with respect to parameters listed in the Code.” 
 
                                                 
50 This interpretation is based on the EC Recommendation on independent directors, Annex 1, e). 
51 If the controlling shareholder is a state-owned entity, the economic link does exist if the independent director 
of the company concerned is a consultant, employee, executive director of another state-owned entity; it does not 
exist if the independent director of the company concerned is a non-executive director in another state-owned 
entity or is a public employee enjoying autonomous status (such as university professors). 
52http://europa.eu.int/servlet/portail/RenderServlet?search=DocNumber&lg=en&nb_docs=25&domain=Legislati
on&coll=&in_force=NO&an_doc=1983&nu_doc=349&type_doc=Directive  
53 With specific reference to the term “indirectly”, the Preda code states that: “For the purpose of assessing 
independence, “indirect” business and shareholder relationships are also taken into consideration. It is therefore 
necessary to consider relationships between: on the one hand, directors, members of their families, the 
professional partnerships of which they are members, the companies they or members of their families control 
directly or indirectly, and the companies of which such persons are directors or managers and, on the other hand, 
the company in question, the shareholders who, directly or indirectly, control it, the executive directors, and the 
companies such persons control directly or indirectly.” 
54 For the interpretation of the term “control”, see above explanation in first requirement. 
55 Reg. (EC) No. 2238/2004 of 29 December 2004. 
56 Preda Code, art. 3.1 (b)   30
PR_C (family ties) 
 
[Independent directors] “are not immediate family members of executive directors of the 
company or of persons in the situations referred to in points a) and b).”
57 
 
We interpret “close family member” according to the definition provided by Regulation 
1725/2003, footnote 32 (clarifying the content of IAS 24): “Close members of the family of 
an individual are those that may be expected to influence, or be influenced by, that person in 
their dealings with the enterprise.”
58 
 
We consider the present criterion to be satisfied by the company when specific and explicit 
reference to it is made in the relevant company documents (annual report or governance 
statement); we consider it not satisfied when the relevant documents of the company 
concerned make only general reference to the respect of the independence criteria of the Preda 
code as a whole, without specifying either that the independent director is not an immediate 
family member of the executive directors of the company or of persons in the situations 
referred to in points a) and b) or that the independent director satisfies the criteria established 
in article 3.1 of the Preda code.
59 
 
PR_D (professional qualification) 
 
Independent directors are required to be professionally qualified persons.
60  
 
For the verification of the present criterion we decided, even in absence of a complete CV, to 
deduct professional qualification from the number and quality of present positions held by the 
independent director.  
 
PR_E (other commitments) 
 
“Directors shall accept their appointment to the board when they deem they can devote the 
necessary time to the diligent performance of their duties, taking account, among other things, 
of the number of positions they hold on the boards of directors or auditors of other companies 
listed on regulated markets, including foreign markets, financial companies, banks, insurance 
companies and large companies.”
61 
 
We interpret this requirement as meaning that the director should not hold more than 2 tasks 
involving directorships in companies (including the one held in the concerned company) and 
2 tasks different from directorships in companies, such as being a university professor, a 
professional lawyer, and so on. In this last respect, we only consider full-time commitments 
and do not include honorary or part-time commitments, such as editor of a scientific journal 
or chairperson or member of the board of a museum or other not-for-profit entity. As a 
general rule, we assigned “yes”, “no”, and “ns” on the basis of present commitments as 
                                                 
57 Preda Code, art. 3.1 (c) 
58 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 adopting certain international accounting 
standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32003R172
5&model=guichett  
59 The present interpretation, which may seem formalistic, should be read keeping in mind the difficulty of 
verifying the present criterion, as illustrated in par. 2.5.  
60 Preda Code, paragraphs  2.1/2.2 
61 Preda Code, paragraph 1.3   31
reported by the company’s corporate governance statement and by the director’s CV. In cases 
in which corporate governance statements did not report other commitments and there was no 
CV available, we assigned “yes”. We assigned “ns” when there was no CV and the director 
had another commitment apart from being independent director in the company under 
scrutiny. The rationale was that in these cases it was not possible to exclude that the director 
had other extra-company, full-time commitments.  
 
This interpretation is based on the results of an empirical study conducted by Protiviti (2004) 
on the commitments of directors in Italian listed companies. According to the study, 
independent directors who also sit on three other committees of the same company (audit 
committee, remuneration committee, nomination committee) have an average of 25 meetings 
per year. For independent directors who sit on three company boards, this would mean that 
they would have 75 meetings per year, roughly one every three working days. It is true that in 
several cases independent directors do not sit on all three committees at the same time. On the 
other hand, there is a high variance in the average number of meetings of the audit and 
remuneration committee. For instance, the average yearly number of audit committee 
meetings is 7, but the maximum is 17. For the remuneration committee, the average number 
of meetings is 4 but the maximum is 19. Moreover, in several cases Italian independent 
directors also sit on executive committees, whose meetings are not considered in the Protiviti 
count.  
 
Our interpretation reflects the important workload that an independent director is supposed to 
take on each specific board where she serves. For instance, the corporate governance rules of 
the New York Stock Exchange
62  identify the tasks involved in being a member of the 
nominating, remuneration and audit committees, stressing in particular the "demanding role 
and responsibilities" of being a member of the audit committee, going on to enumerate the 
numerous tasks that audit committee members are required to fulfil. Moreover, the same 
corporate governance rules require all "non-management directors" of a company to meet at 
regularly scheduled executive sessions without management. Finally, independent directors, 
irrespective whether they also sit on a board committee, are expected to systematically check 
all important management decisions to prevent conflicts of interest and to systematically 




Another empirical argument in favor of the present interpretation comes from a recent paper 
by Fich and Shivdasani (2004), who find that (p. 1) “When a majority of outside directors 
serve on three or more boards, firms exhibit lower market-to-book ratios as well as weaker 
operating profitability.” 
 
Finally, it should be considered that we assigned "yes" whenever the issuer gave an 
explanation why an independent director who has a higher number of commitments should 





                                                 
62 http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/finalcorpgovrules.pdf  
63 Black 2001. 
64 In this we followed the general rule recommended by the Higgs Report (p. 37): "The board should state its 
reasons if a director is considered to be independent notwithstanding the existence of relationships or 
circumstances which may appear relevant to its determination."    32
B.2: EC criteria 
 
In this paragraph, we illustrate our interpretation of the independence criteria set by the EC 
Recommendation. Such interpretation, although based on official documents, is to be 
considered as a free interpretation of the authors. It is not to be considered under any 
circumstances an official interpretation.  
 
EC_A (executive in the (assoc.) company) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…be an executive or managing director of the 




We interpret the term “associated company” as parent companies, subsidiaries and in general 
companies falling within the consolidation perimeter as defined by art. 1, par. 1, 7th Company 
Law Directive.  
 
We interpret the term “executive” as including those board members who also sit on the 
executive committee (where present) of the same company. Such an interpretation is based on 
the fact that the EC Recommendation specifies that (art. 2.3): “the term executive director 
means any member of the administrative body (unitary board) who is engaged in the daily 
management of the company.” On the other hand, we observe that executive committees in 
Italian listed companies are entrusted with the daily management of the company.
66 We 
remind that such interpretation, as all interpretations to the Preda Code and the EC 
Recommendation provided in this study, engages only the responsibility of the authors and is 
not to be considered under any circumstances an official interpretation. 
 
EC_B (employee of the (assoc.) company) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…be an employee of the company or an associated 
company, and not having been in such a position for the previous three years, except when the 
non-executive or supervisory director does not belong to senior management and has been 
elected to the (supervisory) board in the context of a system of workers’ representation 
                                                 
65 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (a) 
66 To show that members of executive committees in Italian listed companies do have a role in the management 
of their companies, we report here the relevant parts taken from a couple of financial statements. The first one is 
from Banca Popolare di Milano, Bilancio sociale del gruppo Bipiemme per il 2004, p. 47. 
http://www.borsaitalia.it/media/borsa/db/pdf/new/11317.pdf : “Amministrazione. Al Comitato Esecutivo, in 
forza della delega, sono stati attribuiti prevalentemente poteri di proposta e di esame in materia di indirizzo 
strategico, di politiche generali, di bilancio, di previsione di spesa e di investimenti. Esegue inoltre tutte le 
delibere affidategli dal Consiglio di Amministrazione.” The second one is from Banco popolare di Verona e 
Novara, Relazione annuale sulla corporate governance per l’anno 2003, p. 98. 
http://www.borsaitalia.it/media/borsa/corporgo/new/3605.pdf : ““È stato costituito un Comitato Esecutivo, 
composto da 9 membri, il cui funzionamento è regolato all’art. 41 dello statuto sociale. Il Comitato si riunisce di 
norma nelle settimane in cui non si riunisce il Consiglio di amministrazione. Per esigenze di snellezza e di 
efficienza operativa, il Consiglio medesimo ha delegato al Comitato Esecutivo proprie competenze, in 
particolare in materia di: erogazione del credito; emissione di prestiti obbligazionari; personale (assunzioni, 
promozioni, provvedimenti disciplinari, ecc.) con esclusione dei dirigenti; locazioni;  transazioni su partite in 
sofferenza o incagli entro limiti prestabiliti. Delle deliberazioni assunte dal Comitato Esecutivo viene data 
notizia al Consiglio di amministrazione nella sua prima riunione in conformità all’art. 44 dello Statuto sociale.”   33
recognised by law and providing for adequate protection against abusive dismissal and other 
forms of unfair treatment.”
67 
 
We interpret the expression “previous three years” as to the previous three financial years.  
 
EC_C (additional remuneration) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…receive, or have received, significant additional 
remuneration from the company or an associated company apart from a fee received as non-
executive or supervisory director. Such additional remuneration covers in particular any 
participation in a share option or any other performance-related pay scheme; it does not cover 
the receipt of fixed amounts of compensation under a retirement plan (including deferred 
compensation) for prior service with the company (provided that such compensation is not 
contingent in any way on continued service).”
68 
 
For the term “associated company”, see the interpretation provided for EC_A. 
  
We interpret “additional remuneration” as having received shares from the same company or 
from controlling companies as a remuneration or in any case without consideration. On the 
other hand, shares purchased by the director with her own means (whatever the number) are 
not relevant in this context.  
 
We interpret the term “significant” as any sum larger than EUR 50,000. This sum is relevant 
vis-à-vis the average remuneration of independent directors. For instance, according to a 
survey quoted by Higgs (2003), the annual suggested pay for independent directors is between 
£40,000 and £60,000 for FTSE 100.
69 Moreover, the significance threshold fixed by Borsa 
Italiana for related party transactions is EUR 50,000.
70  The same applies also to the 
significant threshold established by PR_A and EC_E. 
 
We interpret the term “in particular” as: not exclusively. This means that, as regards 
remuneration received from an associated company, additional means not necessarily stock 
options or other performance-related pay schemes.
71 
 
EC_D (representing controlling shareholders) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…be or represent in any way the controlling 
shareholder(s) (control being determined by reference to the cases mentioned in Article 1(1) 
of Council Directive 83/349/EEC.)”
72 
 
We interpret “represent” as also meaning executive director. See above for the definition of 
executive director.  
 
                                                 
67 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (b) 
68 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (c) 
69 Par. 12.23, p. 56. 
70 Borsa Italiana, Regolamento dei mercati organizzati e gestiti da Borsa Italiana in material di internal dealing. 
71 See Cappiello 2005, p. 107-110 for a survey of the academic literature on this criterion, with a particular 
emphasis on the positions favorable to allowing a certain degree of flexibility: according to the author, 
performance-related compensation could actually motivate independent directors to have a more adversarial 
attitude vis-à-vis executive directors. 
72 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (d)   34
EC_E (business relationship) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…have, or have had within the last year, a significant 
business relationship with the company or an associated company, either directly or as a 
partner, shareholder, director or senior employee of a body having such a relationship. 
Business relationships include the situation of a significant supplier of goods or services 
(including financial, legal, advisory or consulting services), of a significant customer, and of 
organisations that receive significant contributions from the company or its group.”
73 
 
We interpret the expression “within the last year” as the previous financial year. 
 
We interpret the expression “business relationships” as involving: the independent director in 
person; professional partnerships of which independent directors are members; companies of 
which the independent director is a shareholder, director, or senior employee; the company in 
question (on whose board the independent director sits); and associated companies (see EC_A 
above for a definition of this term). 
 
As for the meaning of “business relationships” in this context, the Recommendation mentions 
the situation of (i) a significant supplier of goods or services (including financial, legal, 
advisory, or consulting services), (ii) of a significant customer, and (iii) of organizations that 
receive significant contributions from the company or its group. We considered that there is 
no business relationship if the independent director is also non-executive director or a member 
of the Italian “collegio sindacale” of the controlling shareholder, associated companies, or 
companies that the corporation consolidates. 
 
EC_F (external auditor) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…be, or have been within the last three years, partner 








[The independent director should] “not…be executive or managing director in another 
company in which an executive or managing director of the company is non-executive or 
supervisory director; and not to have other significant links with executive directors of the 
company through involvement in other companies or bodies.”
75 
 
This criterion was evaluated with reference to cross-directorships with listed companies, the 
only ones reported in the database of Consob website, while the criterion as set by the 
Recommendation refers in general to all other companies, not differentiating between listed 
and unlisted ones. So it is possible that behind some of the “yes” rates lie cross-directorships 
with unlisted companies.  
 
                                                 
73 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (e) 
 
74 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (f) 
75 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (g)   35
EC_H (permanence on the board) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…have served on the (supervisory) board as a non-
executive or supervisory director for more than three terms (or, alternatively, more than 12 
years where national law provides for normal terms of a very small length).”
76 
 
We interpret this criterion as not being satisfied also when the independent director in 
precedence has served on the board of one of the companies which merged into the present 
one. 
 
With reference to Italy, we interpret this criterion according to the fact that directors are 
appointed for three-year terms. From this follows that this criterion is not satisfied when a 
director has been sitting on the same board for more than nine years. 
 
EC_I (family ties) 
 
[The independent director should] “not…be a close family member of an executive or 
managing director, or of persons in the situations referred to in points (a) to (h).”
77 
 
We interpret “close family member” according to the definition provided by Regulation 
1725/2003, footnote 32 (clarifying the content of IAS 24): “Close members of the family of 
an individual are those that may be expected to influence, or be influenced by, that person in 
their dealings with the enterprise.”
78 
 
We consider the present criterion to be satisfied by the company when a specific and explicit 
reference to it, as defined by the national cg code, is made in the relevant company documents 
(annual report or governance statement); we consider it not satisfied (and therefore we assign 
“ns” rate) when the relevant documents of the company concerned make only general 
reference to adherence to the independence criteria of the national code as a whole, without 
further specification.  
 
EC_L (professional qualification) 
 




As already explained for PR_D, apart from a complete CV, for the verification of the present 
criterion it can be also sufficient that the competence result from the number and quality of 





                                                 
76 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (h) 
77 EC Recommendation, ANNEX 1. (i) 
78 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1725/2003 of 29 September 2003 adopting certain international accounting 
standards in accordance with Regulation (EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc&lg=en&numdoc=32003R172
5&model=guichett  
79   EC Recommendation, Recital point (15) / (16) and EC Recommendation, SECTION III points 11. 
“Qualifications”   36
EC_M (other commitments) 
 
“Each director should devote to his duties the necessary time and attention, and should 
undertake to limit the number of his other professional commitments (in particular any 




We interpret this requirement as meaning that the director must not hold more than 2 tasks 
involving directorships in companies (including the one held in the concerned company) and 
2 tasks different from directorships in companies, such as being a university professor, a 
professional lawyer, and so on. In this last respect, we do not include honorary commitments. 
 
Finally, the same interpretative arguments used in PR_E above apply also to this criterion.  
 
 
B.3: Verifiability of Preda and EC criteria 
 
Important aspects of the Preda and EC criteria are their verifiability and their measurability. 
Company disclosure should enable investors to verify the respect of independence criteria to a 
reasonable extent. Moreover, the more measurable the data provided in company disclosure 
are, the easier will be the assessment conducted by investors and financial analysts. In this 
respect, not all independence criteria are on the same ground. The purpose of this paragraph is 
to illustrate the characteristics of each Preda and EC criterion from the point of view of their 
verifiability and measurability.  
 
As regards the Preda criteria, the least verifiable is PR_D, since in this case it is not entirely 
clear what should be intended for professional qualification. In this respect, neither the Preda 
Code nor the EC Recommendation provide guidance. As can be seen from OECD (2003), the 
debate on this point varies from contributions that stress the importance of financial literacy to 
others that stress the importance that company boards be made of directors with diversified 
skills and backgrounds.  
 
More verifiable is PR_C, for which we decided to rely on company disclosure. However, 
given our methodological assumptions illustrated in par. 2, this requirement is very difficult 
for the average investor to verify short of embarking on an investigative enquiry, since in 
order to have “no” rates for this criterion directors should “confess” to being related to 
executive directors or to some other category considered by the present criterion. All the 
average investor can do is to rely on the issuer statement that the director satisfies this 
criterion. It should also be noted that often issuers themselves specify that they rely, on this 
point, on a statement provided by each independent director.  
 
Finally, PR_A, PR_B, and PR_E are the criteria which allow for a higher quality of 
verification by investors through company disclosure: as regards PR_B, verification is made 
easier by disclosure made by all companies within our population of shares personally owned; 
as regards PR_A and PR_E, it is possible to consult the entire list of present commitments for 
each director, which issuers are required to include in their corporate governance statement by 
the Preda Code; to verify compliance with PR_A, a complete CV makes it also possible to 
check past commitments.  
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As regards those EC criteria that, as specified in par. 2.1 above, are not included within the 
Preda Code, for EC_G (cross-directorships), the Consob database allows one to check only 
among listed companies; for EC_H (permanence on the board), the Consob database allows 
one to check only as far back as 1998; for EC_C (additional remuneration) Consob requires 
companies to disclose additional remuneration received by directors from the company and 
from associated companies.   